International Entanglement: Policy Action at a Distance
Lessons in Security Cooperation from Ukraine and Taiwan
Lee Slusher is the CEO of BT Consulting LLC and creator of Deep Dive with Lee Slusher. Chris Anderson is the Chief Operating officer of Troika Solutions. They were the primary architects of a multiyear effort to boost Taiwan’s defense doctrine and training.
An action in one country can trigger a response in another, even if the causal relationship between the link is less than apparent.
In 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine. Shortly thereafter, attention turned to East Asia, as many considered the potential parallels with China and Taiwan. In each instance, a larger, more powerful country threatened the security of a neighbor with which it had unique ties— cultural, linguistic, historical, and so on.
In 2022, Russia again invaded Ukraine, and attention again turned to East Asia. Unlike in 2014, the stakes now are much higher across the board. High-intensity conflict now ravages Ukraine, and China has brought its efforts to isolate Taiwan to new heights.
The war in Ukraine jeopardizes vital energy and food supplies, reviving the primal fears of cold and hunger—even in the most advanced nations. A war in Taiwan would threaten the vital semiconductor industry without which the world would experience a sudden and forceful return to the analogue age.
To be clear, the Ukraine and Taiwan crises are not carbon copies of one another. Each is different in important ways. Nonetheless, one cannot ignore the implications and lessons of Western policy (in)action on both matters. Looming above these already frightful situations is the specter of a major war between nuclear-armed powers.
Asymmetry Abounds
The Ukraine War reignited conversations about deterrence. It is decidedly better to forestall a war than to let one run wild, at least in most instances, including in Ukraine. Russia, obviously, was not deterred. How then to make Taiwan a hard enough target to dissuade—or at least delay—China’s firmly declared goal of reunification?
A singular, or even primary, focus on conventional military capabilities, including advanced ones, is an obvious, but faulty go-to. China has similar capabilities, but in much greater supply. This is true of the weapons, the necessary production inputs, and the required industrial capability—not to mention other key advantages. Some claim Western assistance could fill this void, pointing to Ukraine as an example. This view is fiction—first that Ukraine has a blank check, and second that the account cannot be overdrawn.
This is not to say Taiwan ought to abandon the conventional capabilities that would result in heavy Chinese losses in the opening days of conflict. Rather, it highlights the need for a more “diverse portfolio.” A war with China would quickly place Taiwan on the backfoot of conventional warfare. Why not plan for this eventuality with an asymmetric defense—one replete with roving anti-tank and anti-aircraft missile teams, electronic warfare, drones, etc.? Moreover, why not make public a conquest of the island would be akin to swallowing a porcupine?
Truth be told, many have advocated for precisely this approach in the past few years. A simple Google search will return a flood of articles from think tank researchers and journalists, all of whom agree—asymmetry is the order of the day in Taiwan. Much lesser known is the fact that, staring in early 2015, the US Army’s now-deactivated Asymmetric Warfare Group, or AWG, began a multiyear effort with the military of Taiwan to accomplish precisely these goals.
The project commenced in earnest after the US Special Operations Command Pacific read AWG’s analysis of how Russia swiftly invaded and annexed Crimea, and the how such tactics might translate to China and Taiwan. This led to a cooperative effort between those two groups, US Army Pacific, and the American Institute in Taiwan, the US’s de facto embassy on the island. The Taiwan Army1 hosted the exchanges. The American contingents included seasoned practitioners from AWG and the other military commands, as well as civilian experts, public and private.
The backbone of the effort was a series of tabletop exercises. Unlike other efforts, this one was not based on the Chinese invasion scenario, which is repeated with dizzying frequency. Rather, this scenario focused on the continual but slow erosion of Taiwan’s sovereignty. Absent an overt military threat, what should Taiwan do? The overarching theme was to avoid war in the first place by establishing what we referred to as a “credible deterrence.”
In addition to missile teams and the like, the country’s special operators could focus not on the protection of critical infrastructure—likely to be destroyed in artillery bombardments—but on training leading reservists as guerillas. Engineers could focus not so much on the beaches but on creating a defense in depth, making use of obstacles and channelizing terrain. Critically—the program advocated Taiwan publicize its new strategy to the greatest extent possible. As we learned from the doomsday device in Kubrick’s “Dr. Strangelove,” a deterrent strategy is worthless if kept secret.
The program had modest but noticeable results. In 2018, Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang military exercise reflected, “the military’s doctrinal shift from annihilation of the enemy to prevention of victory for the aggressor.” After the conclusion of the program, we learned of encouraging news. Then-Admiral Lee Hsi-min, serving as the Chief of Staff of the General Staff of Taiwan’s military, enthusiastically promoted the One Defense Concept, a virtually identical effort but with much broader participation across the country’s military.2 However, in the years since the Admiral’s retirement, Taiwan’s leaders experienced some backsliding regarding an asymmetric defense.
The reason why has much to do with culture. Broadly speaking, East Asian peoples place a premium on hierarchy and the values of face-saving and respect for elders. For decades, Taiwan’s defense planning prioritized “prestige weapons,” such as the F-16, and a conventional military defense against a Chinese amphibious invasion. A wholesale change from this status quo would, for some, represent a deep cultural affront. That is, publicly exchanging old policies for new ones would implicate the architects of the old order.
There were hopes to export the program elsewhere in the region. Why not make other nations “harder targets” for Beijing? Doing so could help keep the peace and promote US interests without conflict. But the effort lost steam in the churn of personnel and leaders that defines life in the US’s sprawling foreign policy and national security apparatus.
Security Cooperation as A Deterrent
AWG’s efforts in Taiwan were sufficient to begin to show results. Naturally, we wondered what should come next. The answer requires a bit of background.
The US engages in security cooperation with most countries of the world. Sometimes this occurs as joint training exercises or participation in professional military education systems—from military academies to jungle warfare schools to pilot training to just about anything else. Other times the US sells weapons (Foreign Military Sales) or extends credit with which other countries can purchase weapons (Foreign Military Financing). Such interactions range from one-offs to longstanding relationships with allies with which the US has mutual defense pacts. In other words, security cooperation is a flexible, wide-ranging tool for a variety of foreign policy endeavors.
Too often, these efforts lack a meaningful, overarching strategic goal. For instance, the US seeks to counter China’s influence in the South China Sea. Why not have security cooperation efforts align specifically to support this strategic goal? Policy wonks might claim this already occurs. They could point to the line and paragraph of an official document stating as much—these efforts support the US goal to…The problem, of course, is that such a view can survive only in the rarefied air along the Potomac. US efforts abroad tell a very different story.
A similar myopia exists among many US military leaders. These past decades of war focused largely on the creation of functional armies abroad, or at least that was the goal. This persisted so long that it spawned the lazy, bureaucratic habit of declaring all activities with allied militaries as “building partner capacity.” Capacity to do what, exactly? Can they do it well? Can they do it without US support? Do they even want to do it in the first place?
This is not to disparage the activities that currently occur during security cooperation efforts—rifle ranges, first aid, land navigation, etc. are necessary and should continue. But they do not, by themselves, support any strategic goal. US leaders often cite the mere presence of its forces in a particular region as a deterrent. Sure, this is true by a very lowly, brutish standard, but nothing more.
We propose a two-pronged approach. Imagine the security cooperation efforts described above as the body of an organism—the moving parts. Now ask the question, where’s the brain? This is where the approach AWG pioneered in Taiwan enters the picture. Use this methodology to manifest a shared strategic purpose, identify vulnerabilities, and set corresponding goals. Then, using this framework, decide where and when to execute those tactical exercises, but with greater effect.
Reckoning with Reality (and Failure)
Let us consider Ukraine once more. Between Russia’s 2014 invasion and its most recent one, the US spent a small fortune in Ukraine, largely on the creation of the US-style combat training center near Yavoriv (which Russian missiles severely damaged.) Neither that project nor any other created a meaningful deterrent.
But this was because US security cooperation there was never about deterrence. Rather, it was an effort to do “something” while simultaneously not doing “too much.” NATO gave lip-service to Ukraine’s right to self-determination, but also expected Kyiv to fall in a weekend. The ongoing, lavish supply of Western weapons and targeting intelligence to Ukraine was never part of the plan. All current and continued Western support are reactions to Russia’s actions—not the other way around.
Here’s an even harsher reality check—the world faces a five-headed hydra of fiscal, monetary, economic, energy, and food crises (if not others.) As a result, the US will be able to do less going forward than it had in the past. This reality has yet to sink in among many in Washington and most in the chattering classes. No matter—this is a self-correcting problem.
It is time to rethink security cooperation as a tool of deterrence while there is still time to do something other than react. This remains the best military option to pursue strategic goals without firing a shot.3
We realize you want this to read, “Taiwanese” but our former colleagues on the island always insisted we avoid the term as it refers to the island’s indigenous population instead of the overall population, which is predominantly Han Chinese.
We do not know if the advent of the One Defense Concept was related to AWG’s efforts in Taiwan. Rather, we were encouraged to see the ideas take hold.
BT Consulting LLC purchased all images from Deposit Photos.